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Notes & Comments 
 
G.G. EX REL. GRIMM v. GLOUCESTER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD: 
BROADENING TITLE IX’S PROTECTIONS  
FOR TRANSGENDER STUDENTS 
SAM WILLIAMSON 
In G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board,1 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a 
transgender boy’s Title IX claim.2  G.G., known outside of court documents 
as Gavin Grimm,3 sought access to the boys’ restroom at his school.4  Sex-
segregation of bathrooms is legal under Title IX because of a Department of 
Education regulation.5  At the time the Fourth Circuit first heard G.G., the 
Department of Education interpreted its regulation as requiring schools to 
provide transgender students access to the restrooms consistent with their 
gender identity.6  The Fourth Circuit held that because the Department’s 
regulation was ambiguous, and because the interpretation was not plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation or Title IX, the Department’s 
interpretation merited controlling weight.7  Thus, the Fourth Circuit set the 
legal foundation to allow a transgender boy to access the boys’ restroom in 
public schools.8 
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 J.D. Candidate, 2018, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  The 
author wishes to thank Professor Frank Pasquale and Jer Welter each for his inspiration and 
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 1.  822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239, 
1239 (2017) (mem.). 
 2.  Id. at 715. 
 3.  G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/gg-v-
gloucester-county-school-board (last updated Mar. 6, 2017). 
 4.  G.G., 822 F.3d at 714. 
 5.  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2015). 
 6.  See infra note 78 (collecting Department of Education guidance). 
 7.  G.G., 822 F.3d at 721. 
 8.  G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 4:15cv54, 2016 WL 3581852, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 
23, 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1239, 1239 (2017) (mem.). 
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While the Fourth Circuit’s decision led to the appropriate 
conclusion—that the Gloucester County School Board must give Gavin 
access to the boys’ restroom—the Fourth Circuit should have conducted its 
own statutory interpretation.9  The Fourth Circuit correctly noted that the 
Department of Education regulation was ambiguous and that the 
Department’s interpretation of the regulation was not plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the statute.10  Accordingly, under the existing doctrinal 
framework, the Fourth Circuit correctly granted deference to the 
interpretation.11  Yet, this framework is inadequate for protecting 
marginalized groups, such as transgender students.12  The judiciary should 
not continue to grant deference to administrative agencies on questions 
concerning the rights of discrete and insular minorities when the agencies’ 
authority to regulate was merely implicitly delegated.13  Instead, courts 
should extend the major questions doctrine to include regulations that 
substantially implicate the rights of discrete and insular minorities.14  If the 
court did not grant deference and conducted an independent analysis, the 
court should have looked to the analogous Title VII.15  Applying Title VII 
case law, the court should have reached the same conclusion—Gloucester 
County School Board must allow Gavin to use the boys’ restroom.16 
I.  THE CASE 
During his freshman year of high school in Gloucester County Public 
Schools, Gavin came out as a transgender boy.17  At birth, he was 
considered female, but “at a very young age, G.G. did not feel like a girl.”18  
Instead, Gavin identified as male.19  Gavin initially tried to hide his identity 
as male, but the stress of hiding caused “severe depression and anxiety.”20  
As a result, Gavin stopped attending school and took classes at home.21  
                                                          
 9.  See infra Part IV. 
 10.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 11.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 12.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 13.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 14.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 15.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 16.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 17.  G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 739 (E.D. Va. 
2015), rev’d, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 
1239, 1239 (2017) (mem.). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
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When he told his family about his identity as male, he began seeing a 
psychologist and was diagnosed with gender dysphoria.22  His prescribed 
treatment plan indicated, “[H]e should be treated as a boy in all respects, 
including with respect to his use of the restroom.”23 
In the month before his sophomore year of high school, Gavin began 
working with his school to achieve social acceptance as a boy.24  The school 
updated its records to reflect Gavin’s new legal name, which is traditionally 
masculine.25  Gavin requested that his teachers use his chosen name and 
male pronouns in reference to him.26  Though Gavin initially planned to use 
the gender-neutral bathroom in the nurse’s office, when the school year 
began he found use of the separate bathroom to be “stigmatizing.”27  Upon 
Gavin’s request, the school allowed him to use the boys’ restroom.28  Gavin 
did not need locker room access because he took his physical education 
class at home.29 
While Gavin’s previous use of the girls’ restrooms invoked negative 
reactions from women—including at school where girls asked Gavin to 
leave30—Gavin had no issues when he used the boys’ restroom.31  He did 
not hear any complaints from students or have any issues with privacy or 
safety.32  The School Board, however, received several complaints about 
Gavin’s use of the boys’ restroom, including dozens of public comments at 
School Board meetings.33  These complaints came from “members of the 
community,” which may or may not include children who attended the 
school.34  In response, the school created three gender-neutral, single-stall 
restrooms, and improved privacy in the gendered bathrooms by raising the 
doors and walls around the stalls and placing partitions between urinals.35  
The School Board also implemented a policy on December 9, 2014, that use 
                                                          
 22.  Id.  According to the American Psychiatric Association, gender dysphoria is “the distress 
that may accompany the incongruence between one’s experienced and expressed gender and one’s 
assigned gender.” Id. at 739 n.4 (quoting AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013)). 
 23.  Id. at 739. 
 24.  Id. at 739–40. 
 25.  Id. at 740. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id.  
 30.  Id. at 741. 
 31.  Id. at 750. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 740. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 741. 
 2017]    G.G. EX REL. GRIMM v. GLOUCESTER COUNTY SCH. BD. 1105 
 
of restrooms and locker rooms “shall be limited to the corresponding 
biological genders, and students with gender identity issues shall be 
provided an alternative appropriate private facility.”36  The term “biological 
gender[]” was meant to confine transgender students to the gender 
traditionally associated with their genitalia.37  If Gavin used the boys’ 
restroom, the school planned to discipline him.38 
Gavin informed the court that he could not use the girls’ restroom or 
the gender-neutral restrooms.39  In December 2014, Gavin began taking 
hormones that further masculinized his appearance, including deepening his 
voice and producing facial hair.40  Given the previous negative reactions to 
his presence in the girls’ restroom, Gavin felt he could not use the girls’ 
restrooms.41  Further, if Gavin used the girls’ restroom it would cause him 
“severe psychological stress” and undermine his “medically necessary 
treatment for Gender Dysphoria.”42  If Gavin used the gender-neutral 
restrooms, he would be “stigmatize[d] and isolate[d],” rather than accepted 
as the boy that he is.43  Feeling unable to use any restrooms at school, Gavin 
did not use the restrooms when he needed to, causing multiple urinary tract 
infections.44 
Gavin sued the Gloucester County School Board in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging violations of the 
Equal Protection Clause and Title IX.45  Gavin moved for a preliminary 
injunction to allow him use of the boys’ restroom during the litigation.46  
The School Board opposed the motion and moved to dismiss the suit.47  The 
                                                          
 36.  Id. at 740 (quoting Complaint at ¶ 34, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 
132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 739 (E.D. Va. 2015) (No. 14cv54), rev’d, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), 
vacated, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239, 1239 (2017) (mem.)).  Note that the 
court opinion has a typographical error stating the resolution passed in December 2015.  Id. at 
741. 
 37.  Id. at 740. 
 38.  Id. at 741. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. (quoting Complaint at ¶ 46, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. 
Supp. 3d 736, 739 (E.D. Va. 2015) (No. 4:15cv54), rev’d, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated, 
Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239, 1239 (2017) (mem.)). 
 43.  Id.  Furthermore, the gender-neutral restrooms are far away from Gavin’s classes.  Id. at 
749. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 741. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
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district court granted the motion to dismiss the Title IX claim and denied 
the motion for a preliminary injunction.48 
The district court found that Gavin failed to state a valid claim under 
Title IX.49  Title IX’s regulation allows for separate but equal restrooms, 
divided on the basis of “sex.”50  The court reasoned that Gavin’s sex was 
female and that only his gender identity was male.51  Thus, unless Title IX 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of gender identity alone, the School 
Board could legally separate the restrooms based on sex and prohibit Gavin 
from used the male restroom.52  The court stated that “under any fair 
reading, ‘sex’ in Section 106.33 clearly includes biological sex.”53  The 
court acknowledged that the Department of Education released a significant 
guidance document in 2014, stating that “[u]nder Title IX, a [federal 
funding] recipient must generally treat transgender students consistent with 
their gender identity.”54  This guidance, which remained in place until 
February 22, 2017,55 suggested that Gavin must be allowed to use the boys’ 
restroom.56  However, the court found that the guidance should not be 
granted deference because (1) the regulation was “not ambiguous,” and (2) 
the interpretation was “plainly erroneous and inconsistent with the 
regulation.”57  In essence, the court viewed the guidance as promulgating a 
new regulation outside of the process mandated by the Administrative 
Procedure Act.58  Thus, the court dismissed Gavin’s Title IX claim.59 
The court rejected Gavin’s motion for a preliminary injunction on the 
grounds that it did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that 
Gavin would suffer greater hardship than the School Board upon an adverse 
ruling.60  The court determined that Gavin’s declarations that other students 
                                                          
 48.  Id. at 738. 
 49.  Id. at 744. 
 50.  Id. (citing Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2015)). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 745. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. (quoting OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SINGLE-SEX ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY CLASSES AND 
EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES 25 (2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/faqs-
title-ix-single-sex-201412.pdf). 
 55.  CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER 1 (2017) [hereinafter 2017 DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER], 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/941551/download. 
 56.  G.G., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 745 (quoting OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 54, at 25). 
 57.  Id. at 746. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 753. 
 60.  Id. 
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were supportive of his use of the boys’ restroom were “self-serving” and 
consisted in large part of “inadmissible hearsay.”61  The court also 
explained that Gavin’s declarations failed to describe his hardships in 
sufficiently “concrete” detail and relied on “nothing more than his own 
declaration and that of a psychologist who met him only once, for the 
purpose of litigation.”62  On the other hand, the court gave “great weight to 
the concerns of the School Board—which represents the students and 
parents in the community.”63  The court found a constitutionally protected 
right to bodily privacy that demands sex-segregated restrooms.64  As such, 
the court declared that the “mere presence of a member of the opposite sex 
in the restroom may embarrass many students and be felt a violation of their 
privacy.”65  Since the court considered Gavin’s sex to be female, the court 
reasoned that allowing Gavin to use the boys’ restroom would cause 
significant hardship to the school system.66  For these reasons, the court 
denied Gavin’s motion for a preliminary injunction.67 
Gavin appealed the district court’s decisions to the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, seeking a grant of the preliminary injunction, reversal of 
the dismissal of his Title IX claim, and reassignment to a different district 
judge.68  The School Board sought to affirm the district court’s holdings and 
to dismiss the remaining claim alleging a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.69 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The central issue in G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board was 
whether to give deference to the Department of Education’s guidance issued 
in 2015, which stated that sex discrimination includes preventing 
transgender students from accessing the restrooms consistent with their 
gender identity.70  This was a novel question that a federal court had not yet 
                                                          
 61.  Id. at 751. 
 62.  Id. at 752–53. 
 63.  Id. at 752. 
 64.  Id. at 750.  The court cited to cases that found a right to privacy in diverse contexts, 
including videotaping students in locker rooms and searching prisoners.  Id. at 750–51. 
 65.  Id. at 752. 
 66.  Id. at 753. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 717 (4th Cir. 2016), 
vacated, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239, 1239 (2017) (mem.). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 715 (quoting Letter from James A. Ferg-Cadima, Acting Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Policy, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Emily T. Prince (Jan. 7, 
2015), http://www.emily-esque.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/DOED-Reply-re-Transgend 
er-Student-Restroom-Access_Redacted.pdf). 
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considered.71  When deciding issues of first impression under Title IX, 
courts consider the treatment of similar issues under the analogous Title 
VII.72  Courts are split on sex discrimination under Title VII, although the 
modern trend has been to broaden sex discrimination to encompass 
discrimination on the basis of one’s transgender identity.73  Given the 
Department of Education’s interpretation, the G.G. court had to determine 
how the interpretation bears on the applicability of Title IX.74  Courts 
generally must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous 
regulations, unless the interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation,” though some exceptions apply.75 
A.  Interpretations of Title IX and Its Regulations 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 forbids 
“discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance [on the basis of sex].”76  Although schools that receive 
federal money may not discriminate on the basis of sex, Department of 
Education regulations provide for certain qualified exceptions.  One of 
these exceptions allows schools to “provide separate toilet, locker room, 
and shower facilities on the basis of sex,” so long as the separate facilities 
are comparable to each other.77  Neither the regulation nor the statute define 
“sex” or discuss transgender students expressly.  In light of recent questions 
surrounding how schools should treat transgender students, the Department 
of Education’s Office for Civil Rights publicly stated that when applying 
the regulation, schools “generally must treat transgender students consistent 
with their gender identity.”78  The Department’s informal guidance 
                                                          
 71.  See infra Part II.A. 
 72.  See infra Part II.B. 
 73.  See infra Part II.B. 
 74.  See infra Part IV.A–B. 
 75.  Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley 
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)); see infra Part II.C. 
 76.  Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901(a), 86 Stat. 235, 373 
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012)). 
 77.  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2015).  The regulation was originally 
promulgated by the predecessor to the Department of Education, the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare.  40 Fed. Reg. 24,141 (June 4, 1975). 
 78.  Letter from James A. Ferg-Cadima to Emily T. Prince, supra note 70.  The Department 
of Education issued several other guidance documents prior to the Fourth Circuit’s decision, each 
similarly asserting that schools must treat transgender students in accordance with their gender 
identity.  OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: 
HARASSMENT AND BULLYING 8 (2010), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/ 
colleague-201010.pdf (“Title IX does protect all students, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) students, from sex discrimination.”); OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T 
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interpreted its regulation to allow sex-segregated facilities, so long as 
schools give transgender students access to the facilities consistent with 
their gender identity.79  After President Trump was elected, the Department 
of Education changed course.  The day before Gavin’s Supreme Court reply 
brief was due,80 the Department of Education rescinded all guidance 
interpreting how Title IX should be applied to transgender students.81 
Prior to G.G., only two courts had considered whether prohibiting 
transgender students from facilities consistent with their gender identity 
violated Title IX or its regulations.82  Before the Department of Education 
issued its initial guidance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit suggested, in an unpublished opinion, that Title IX encompasses 
discrimination on the basis of gender identity.83  In Kastl v. Maricopa 
County Community College District,84 the defendant school district would 
not allow a transgender woman to access the women’s restroom unless she 
                                                          
OF EDUC., supra note 54, at 25 (“Under Title IX, a recipient generally must treat transgender 
students consistent with their gender identity in all aspects of the planning, implementation, 
enrollment, operation, and evaluation of single-sex classes.”); OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 5 (2014), 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf (“Title IX’s sex 
discrimination prohibition extends to claims of discrimination based on gender identity or failure 
to conform to stereotypical notions of masculinity or femininity . . . .”); Civil Rights Division, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Opinion Letter (July 24, 
2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/07/26/arcadialetter.pdf; Office 
for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Opinion Letter (Oct. 14, 2014), 
http://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/downey-school-district-letter.pdf.  
After the Fourth Circuit decision in G.G., the Department of Justice and the Department of 
Education released a Dear Colleague Letter affirming its interpretation that sex discrimination 
“encompasses discrimination based on a student’s gender identity, including discrimination based 
on a student’s transgender status.”  CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & OFFICE FOR 
CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: TRANSGENDER STUDENTS 1 
(2016), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-
transgender.pdf.  Yet, shortly after President Trump took office, the Departments rescinded all of 
the above guidance, leaving the interpretation of Title IX to “the States and local school districts.”  
2017 DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 55, at 1. 
 79.  See supra note 78 (collecting Department of Education guidance documents regarding 
treatment of transgender students under Title IX). 
 80.  Docket for Gloucester County School Board v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/16-
273.htm (last updated Mar. 6, 2017). 
 81.  2017 DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 55, at 1. 
 82.  See, e.g., Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F. App’x 492, 493 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(addressing a claim of sex discrimination against a transgender woman under Title IX and Title 
VII); Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 
657, 674 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (“[I]t does not appear that any federal courts have addressed the precise 
question of whether a student can assert a claim for discrimination on the basis of his transgender 
status under Title IX.”). 
 83.  Kastl, 325 F. App’x at 493. 
 84.  Id. at 492. 
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gave proof that she had undergone sex reassignment surgery.85  On appeal, 
however, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff’s claim failed, not based 
on whether sex discrimination encompasses transgender identities, but 
because the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to show the school 
district was motivated by her gender.86  The Ninth Circuit cited to a case 
determining that “‘sex’ under Title VII encompasses both sex—that is, the 
biological differences between men and women—and gender,”87 and thus 
discrimination on the basis of transgender identity is sex discrimination.88  
The court’s reliance on this case and its ultimate holding suggest that the 
Ninth Circuit, even without the Department of Education’s guidance, may 
conclude that Title IX sex discrimination claims encompass discrimination 
on the basis of transgender identity.89 
Yet, another district court concluded that Title IX does not encompass 
discrimination against transgender identities.90  In Johnston v. University of 
Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education,91 the 
Western District of Pennsylvania held that “[o]n a plain reading of the 
statute, the term ‘on the basis of sex’ in Title IX means nothing more 
than . . . one’s birth or biological sex.”92  Though the court recognized the 
Department of Education’s regulations, it did not mention the Department’s 
then-existing interpretation of those regulations.93  The court relied solely 
upon the analogous Title VII and the plain reading of the statute.94  Thus, 
although the decisions are not uniform, the existing case law prior to G.G. 
had not contemplated the Department’s initial guidance stating that schools 
must grant transgender students access to the facilities consistent with their 
gender identity. 
After the Fourth Circuit decided G.G., courts split on whether Title IX 
requires schools to provide transgender students access to the restrooms 
consistent with their gender identity.  A majority of the courts used the 
Department of Education’s guidance to find a likelihood of success for 
                                                          
 85.  Id. at 493. 
 86.  Id. at 494 (discussing evidence that the restroom policy was created “for safety reasons”). 
 87.  Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 88.  Kastl, 325 F. App’x at 493 (citing Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202–02). 
 89.  See Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 2:15-cv-00388-JAD-PAL, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 138329, at *21 (D. Nev. Oct. 4, 2016) (holding that Title VII sex discrimination 
encompasses discrimination against transgender identities because Kastl “leaves little doubt which 
way the circuit is leaning in transgender Title VII cases.” (citing Kastl, 325 F. App’x 492)). 
 90.  Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 
3d 657, 674 (W.D. Pa. 2015). 
 91.  Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d 657. 
 92.  Id. at 676 (citing Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
 93.  Id. at 678. 
 94.  Id. at 674, 676. 
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claims alleging transgender discrimination under Title IX.95  Yet courts 
have also relied, at least in part, on the analogous case law under Title VII 
to find that Title IX sex discrimination could encompass discrimination 
against transgender identities.96  For example, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio relied on both the Department’s guidance and 
Title VII when ordering a board of education to allow a transgender girl to 
access the girls’ restroom.97  The court “order[ed] School District officials 
to treat Jane Doe as the girl she is.”98  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the court’s 
decision, yet it relied solely on Title VII.99  The appellate court concluded 
that, just like Title VII sex stereotyping theories, Title IX prohibits 
discrimination against someone for “fail[ure] to act and/or identify with his 
or her gender.”100 
Similarly, in the Seventh Circuit, two district courts challenged 
Seventh Circuit precedent that foreclosed the possibility of sex 
discrimination encompassing discrimination against transgender identities 
under Title VII.101  One court distinguished Title VII from Title IX as “a 
different statute with a different legislative history and purpose.”102  The 
other court, perhaps more convincingly, discussed the inconsistencies in 
                                                          
 95.  See Students & Parents for Privacy v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-cv-4945, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 150011, at *59 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2016) (stating that it is “better reasoned” to read 
“sex” as including gender identity); Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 2:16-CV-524, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131474, at *51 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Dodds v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Educ., 845 F.3d 217 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding a transgender student’s Title IX claim likely to 
succeed); Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 16-CV-943-PP, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 129678, at *11 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 22, 2016) (same); Carcaño v. McCrory, No. 1:16cv236, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114605, at *44 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2016) (explaining that G.G. is binding 
precedent on the court).  But see Texas v. United States, No. 7:16-cv-000540-O, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 113459, at *45 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2016) (following the dissent in G.G.). 
 96.  See Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., No. 2:16-01537, 2017 WL 770619, at *19, 22 
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2017) (finding a “reasonable likelihood” that Title IX encompasses 
transgender discrimination based on Title VII case law, but denying the transgender students’ 
motion for a preliminary injunction on the basis of Title IX because of the Supreme Court’s stay 
in G.G.); Bd. of Educ., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131474, at *48 (stating that Title VII case law in 
the Sixth Circuit favors an interpretation of Title IX that encompasses gender identity 
discrimination).  But see Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 674 (noting Title VII cases that exclude 
gender identity discrimination from “sex” discrimination).  For an analysis of Title VII sex 
discrimination, see infra Part II.B. 
 97.  Bd. of Educ., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131474, at *49, 51. 
 98.  Id. at *71. 
 99.  Dodds, 845 F.3d at 221. 
 100.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 
2004)).  
 101.  Students & Parents for Privacy v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-cv-4945, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 150011, at *58 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2016); Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
No. 16-CV-943-PP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129678, at *11 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 22, 2016). 
 102.  Whitaker, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129678, at *11. 
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legal protections for gender identity and sexual orientation before expressly 
endorsing the reasoning laid out by the Fourth Circuit in G.G.103 
However, a district court in the Fifth Circuit has rejected G.G.104  The 
district court concluded that the Department’s guidance was really a 
“legislative and substantive” rule promulgated without following proper 
procedures.105  Illegitimately promulgated rules cannot be given effect.106  
The court further concluded that it would not defer to the guidance because, 
even if the Department had followed all procedures, the regulation was not 
ambiguous.107  The district court found the plain meaning of the regulation 
excluded gender identity from “sex” and, based on this conclusion, it 
ordered a nationwide injunction against enforcing the Department’s 
guidance.108  The injunction allowed schools to choose whether to prohibit 
transgender students from accessing the facilities consistent with their 
gender identity.109  Thus, courts have split on whether Title IX regulations 
require schools to provide transgender students with access to the facilities 
consistent with their gender identity, with a majority of courts concluding 
that the law requires schools to treat transgender students in accordance 
with their gender identity. 
B.  Title VII Sex Discrimination as Applied to Transgender Identities 
Courts often look to Title VII for guidance in Title IX claims.110  Title 
VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex.111  The 
Supreme Court interpreted sex discrimination to encompass discrimination 
on the basis of “gender,” including acting on “sex stereotyping.”112  For 
example, in the landmark case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,113 the Court 
                                                          
 103.  Students & Parents for Privacy, 2016 Dist. LEXIS 150011, at *52–59. 
 104.  Texas v. United States, No. 7:16-cv-000540O, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113459, at *55 
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2016) (following the dissent in G.G.). 
 105.  Id. at *45, 47. 
 106.  Id. at *47. 
 107.  Id. at *52. 
 108.  Id. at *52, 61. 
 109.  Id. at *61. 
 110.  See, e.g., Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007) (“We look to case 
law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for guidance in evaluating a claim 
brought under Title IX.”). 
 111.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 112.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239–40, 250 (1989). 
 113.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228. 
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found that failure to promote a cisgender woman114 because she was too 
“macho” could constitute sex discrimination.115   
Courts have split, however, on whether to expand the definition of sex 
in Title VII to conclude that sex discrimination includes discrimination 
against transgender employees.  Early Title VII case law, such as the 
formative decision in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,116 relied on the plain 
meaning of sex to “decline in [sic] behalf of the Congress to judicially 
expand the definition of sex as used in Title VII beyond its common and 
traditional interpretation.”117  Recent case law, however, has left the door 
open for a more expansive understanding of sex discrimination.118  The 
Seventh Circuit recently overruled Ulane to the extent that it pertains to 
sexual orientation discrimination, while reopening the question of whether 
gender identity is encompassed by “sex.”119  The court suggested that, in a 
future case, it would be willing to include gender identity discrimination 
under sex discrimination.120 
As in Ulane, other circuits have also opened the door to broaden Title 
VII.  Though the Tenth Circuit has not yet extended sex discrimination to 
include transgender discrimination, the circuit expressly contemplated a 
future change in jurisprudence.121  The court noted that “[s]cientific 
                                                          
 114.  That is, a woman whose gender identity matches her sex assigned at birth (a woman who 
is not transgender). 
 115.  Id. at 231–32, 235, 251. 
 116.  742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 117.  Id. at 1086; see also Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 
1982) (“[T]he plain meaning must be ascribed to the term ‘sex’ in absence of clear congressional 
intent to do otherwise.”); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977), 
overruled by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Giving the statute its 
plain meaning, this court concludes that Congress had only the traditional notions of ‘sex’ in 
mind.”).  But see Holloway, 566 F.2d at 664 (Goodwin, J., dissenting) (“It seems to me irrelevant 
under Title VII whether the plaintiff was born female or was born ambiguous and chose to 
become female.  The relevant fact is that she was, on the day she was fired, a purported female.”). 
 118.  Students & Parents for Privacy v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-cv-4945, 2016 Dist. 
LEXIS 150011, at *52 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2016) (describing a trend towards including gender 
identity under “sex” as a means to rectify numerous internal legal inconsistencies in sex 
discrimination doctrine). 
 119.  Hively v. Tech. Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 341, 343 & n.1 (2017) (holding that a 
lesbian’s claim of discrimination because of her sexual orientation is plausible under Title VII). 
 120.  See id. at 343 n.1 (“Many courts, including the Supreme Court, appear to have used ‘sex’ 
and ‘gender’ synonymously.”).  The court’s language closely mirrors the language used in 
Schwenk v. Hartford, in which the Ninth Circuit overruled its precedent to include gender identity 
discrimination under sex discrimination.  Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202 (“[T]he terms ‘sex’ and 
‘gender’ have become interchangeable.”).  At least one district court in the Seventh Circuit would 
support such a decision.  Students & Parents for Privacy, 2016 Dist. LEXIS 150011, at *59 
(“[T]he better reasoned recent decisions hold that the term ‘sex’ in Title IX can be interpreted to 
encompass gender identity . . .”). 
 121.  Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 1114 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:1102 
 
research may someday cause a shift in the plain meaning of the term ‘sex’ 
so that it extends beyond the two starkly defined categories of male and 
female.”122 
Courts across the country have already definitively expanded sex 
discrimination to cover transgender discrimination.  Courts applied the 
reasoning in Price Waterhouse to transgender employees, upholding sex 
discrimination claims by transgender employees because those employees 
“fail[ed] to conform to sex stereotypes.”123  The Ninth Circuit expressly 
overruled its earlier line of reasoning by relying on the logic of Price 
Waterhouse.124  Courts have also indicated that sex discrimination includes 
discrimination against transgender employees per se, that is, without relying 
on a sex stereotyping theory.125  As the District Court for the District of 
Columbia stated: 
Imagine that an employee is fired because she converts from 
Christianity to Judaism.  Imagine too that her employer testifies 
that he harbors no bias toward either Christians or Jews but only 
“converts.”  That would be a clear case of discrimination 
“because of religion.”  No court would take seriously the notion 
that “converts” are not covered by the statute.  Discrimination 
“because of religion” easily encompasses discrimination because 
of a change of religion.  But in cases where the plaintiff has 
changed her sex, and faces discrimination because of the decision 
to stop presenting as a man and to start appearing as a woman, 
courts have traditionally carved such persons out of the statute by 
concluding that “transsexuality” is unprotected by Title VII.  In 
                                                          
 122.  Id. (citing Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 212–13 & n.5 (D.D.C. 2006); 
Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 971 (10th Cir. 1995)).  This standard coincides with the standard 
that a judicial precedent may be overruled when, among other considerations, the “facts have so 
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application 
or justification.”  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992). 
 123.  Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Sex stereotyping based on a 
person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination . . . .”); see also Glenn 
v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Accordingly, discrimination against a 
transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination . . . .”); Finkle 
v. Howard Co., 12 F. Supp. 3d 780, 788 (D. Md. 2014) (“Indeed, it would seem that any 
discrimination against transsexuals (as transsexuals)—individuals who, by definition, do not 
conform to gender stereotypes—is proscribed by Title VII’s proscription of discrimination on the 
basis of sex as interpreted by Price Waterhouse.”). 
 124.  Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201 (“The initial judicial approach taken in cases such as 
Holloway has been overruled by the logic and language of Price Waterhouse.”).  
 125.  Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *10 (EEOC Apr. 20, 
2012) (“Under this theory, there would actually be no need, for purposes of establishing coverage 
under Title VII, for Complainant to compile any evidence that the Director was engaging in 
gender stereotyping.”). 
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other words, courts have allowed their focus on the label 
“transsexual” to blind them to the statutory language itself.126 
Thus, a strand of emerging case law from both federal courts and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission allows transgender employees to 
bring claims of sex discrimination under Title VII. 
C.  Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies 
Administrative agencies perform a unique function in the federal 
government.  Congress delegates, inter alia, legislative authority to 
administrative agencies.127  Along with this authority, agencies are often 
tasked with promulgating the rules necessary to implement an effective 
legislative scheme.128  As such, agencies promulgate binding administrative 
rules and issue statements of policy that have the force of law.  When 
promulgating binding legislative rules, the agency must follow procedures 
set by Congress in either the Administrative Procedure Act or a specific 
statute directed at that particular agency.129  If an agency fails to follow 
proper procedure, courts will invalidate the regulation.130  The federal 
judiciary has developed an intricate set of tests to determine whether and 
how much courts will defer to agency statements when interpreting 
congressional rules and agency regulations.131 
When courts grant Auer deference to an agency’s statement, that 
statement controls the courts’ decisions.132  Auer deference is appropriate if 
the agency is interpreting an ambiguous regulation promulgated by the 
agency itself, unless the interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
                                                          
 126.  Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306–07. 
 127.  Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935). 
 128.  Id. at 630 (stating that the administrative agency “was created by Congress as a means of 
carrying into operation legislative and judicial powers”). 
 129.  See 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012) (stating that Congress may modify the Administrative 
Procedure Act by express language). 
 130.  Hoctor v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 131.  The Supreme Court first endorsed the concept of judicial deference to agencies in 
Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  The Court named several factors that lend weight to 
an agency’s experience and judgment: “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity 
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which 
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”  Id. at 140.  The Court has also indicated 
that agencies are given greater deference when the issue is within a complex area where the 
agency has expertise.  Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991) (Medicare 
regulations). 
 132.  Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).  Less commonly, this type of deference is 
also called Seminole Rock deference, after Bowles, Price Administrator v. Seminole Rock & Sand 
Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945), which held that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is 
controlling unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” 
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with the regulation.”133  Furthermore, the agency’s interpretation must be 
expressed in a way that “lack[s] the force of law,” such as “opinion 
letters, . . . policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement 
guidelines.”134  In Auer v. Robbins,135 the Supreme Court ordered overtime 
pay for police department employees on the basis of the Secretary of 
Labor’s interpretation of his own regulations.136  The Court deferred to an 
interpretation contained in an amicus brief filed in the case.137  In contrast, 
in Christensen v. Harris County,138 the Supreme Court considered whether 
an agency’s opinion letter merited deference as an interpretation of the 
agency’s regulation.139  The regulation stated that employee agreements can 
specify the terms of compensation time, while the interpretation stated 
employers must have a prior agreement with employees before scheduling 
their employee’s compensation time.140  The Court declared that the 
regulation was not ambiguous.141  Because the regulation did not leave 
room for a later interpretation, the interpretation was “de facto a new 
regulation.”142  As mentioned above,143 regulations cannot be promulgated 
except through specific procedures.  Thus, the opinion letter, which failed 
to meet administrative procedure requirements, could not alter the existing 
regulation and no deference could be granted.144 
In a related line of cases, the Supreme Court has limited Auer 
deference by stating that such deference is inappropriate if the interpretation 
is “nothing more than a ‘convenient litigating position’ or a ‘post hoc 
rationalization[n]’ advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency 
action against attack.”145  In Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,146 
the Supreme Court declined to grant Auer deference to a change in a 
“decades-long practice” that would “require regulated parties to divine the 
                                                          
 133.  Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 
332, 359 (1989)). 
 134.  Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
 135.  519 U.S. 452. 
 136.  Id. at 456, 461, 464. 
 137.  Id. at 461. 
 138.  Christensen, 529 U.S. 576. 
 139.  Id. at 587. 
 140.  Id. at 579, 581. 
 141.  Id. at 588. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  See supra notes 129–130 and accompanying text. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012) (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 
(1988); and then quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)). 
 146.  Christopher, 132 S. Ct. 2156. 
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agency’s interpretations in advance or else be held liable.”147  Similarly, in 
Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review 
Commission,148 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
found that, when the Secretary of Labor changed her interpretation of the 
challenged rule several times throughout the course of litigation, the 
Secretary’s interpretation no longer merited Auer deference.149 
In “extraordinary cases,” the Supreme Court has limited another type 
of deference—Chevron deference, which generally concerns formal and 
binding agency interpretations.150  When there is a question of “deep 
‘economic and political significance,’” the Supreme Court has held that an 
agency will not receive deference unless Congress has expressly delegated 
the authority to the agency to interpret that question.151  In King v. 
Burwell,152 the Court held that it would not defer to the Internal Revenue 
Service’s interpretation of the Affordable Care Act’s health insurance 
scheme.153  The ramifications of the interpretation could affect billions of 
dollars in industry and the health insurance of millions of people.154  The 
Court laid the foundation for King in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp.155  There, the Court held that the Food and Drug Administration 
could only have authority over the tobacco industry if Congress had 
expressly required it.156  The Court rested its decision in part on the 
importance of the tobacco industry in the United States.157  Thus, the 
judiciary may at times limit deference to agencies when the issue is of great 
significance.158 
Auer deference has raised concerns among some judges.159  Most 
notably, Justice Scalia criticized the practice of allowing agencies to both 
                                                          
 147.  Id. at 2168. 
 148.  212 F.3d 1301 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 149.  Id. at 1304–05. 
 150.  King v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).  For an analysis of when Chevron deference would be 
appropriate, see United States v. Mead, 553 U.S. 218, 228 (2001). 
 151.  King, 136 S. Ct. at 2489 (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 
2444 (2014)). 
 152.  King, 136 S. Ct. 2480. 
 153.  Id. at 2489. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 156.  Id. at 159. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  King, 136 S. Ct. at 2488–89.  
 159.  See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (collecting opinions from Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Alito, Scalia, and Thomas). 
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promulgate and interpret the law.160  Such an allowance “encourages the 
agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, 
to do what it pleases” without sufficient checks from other branches of 
government.161  By granting agencies this power, rules become less 
predictable.162  Scalia concluded his argument by stating that the Court had 
“not been asked to reconsider Auer in the present cases.  When [the 
Justices] are, [he] will be receptive to doing so.”163  Thus, while Auer 
deference remains good law, there is a judicial support for limiting or 
overruling such deference.164 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, the Fourth 
Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the Eastern District of Virginia’s 
decision, holding that Gavin stated a plausible claim under Title IX and that 
the district court applied the wrong evidentiary standard to the motion for a 
preliminary injunction.165  First, the court found Gavin’s Title IX claim to 
be plausible because the Department of Education interpreted Title IX as 
requiring transgender students to have access to the restrooms consistent 
with their gender identity, and the interpretation merited controlling 
weight.166  Second, in a brief discussion, the Fourth Circuit stated that the 
district court should not have excluded evidence during its consideration of 
the motion for a preliminary injunction.167  The court held that hearsay is 
admissible for this limited purpose, and thus the appellate court remanded 
this portion of the case.168  Third, the Fourth Circuit declined to reassign the 
case to a different judge on remand, given that the court did not find any 
evidence that the district judge would not consider “sound contrary 
evidence.”169  This Note will focus on the court’s analysis of the Title IX 
claim. 
                                                          
 160.  Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 161.  Id. at 69. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Any reader of this Court’s opinions should think that the 
[Auer] doctrine is on its last gasp.”). 
 165.  G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 723, 726 (4th Cir. 2016), 
vacated, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 1239, 1239 (2017) (mem.). 
 166.  Id. at 723. 
 167.  Id. at 725–26. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. at 727. 
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The court held that Gavin stated a claim under Title IX because, 
according to the interpretation then in place, prohibiting a transgender 
student from accessing the restrooms consistent with their gender identity 
constitutes sex discrimination.170  The court granted Auer deference to the 
Department of Education’s interpretation.171  As discussed above,172 under 
Auer, an agency’s interpretation is given controlling weight if: (1) the 
regulation is ambiguous; and (2) the interpretation is not “plainly erroneous 
or inconsistent with the regulation or statute.”173  The court reasoned that 
the regulation allowing sex-segregated restrooms was ambiguous as it 
applies to transgender students because it does not explain how one should 
determine the sex of a transgender student.174  The court stated that the 
regulation does not clearly state the standard for segregating restrooms, 
whether the basis is genitalia or gender identity.175  Even if the regulation 
unambiguously called for the School Board’s interpretation of segregation 
based on biology, the regulation would be ambiguous in several 
hypothetical scenarios: transgender persons who had surgically changed 
their bodies, intersex individuals,176 and those who “lost external genitalia 
in an accident.”177 
The court next determined that the Department’s interpretation was not 
erroneous or inconsistent with the statute.178  Using dictionary definitions 
from the time the regulation was promulgated, the court found that “sex” 
describes a variety of characteristics.179  The court noted that the regulation 
clearly differentiated between those whose characteristics “all point in the 
same direction” but “shed[] little light on how exactly to determine the 
‘character of being either male or female’ where those indicators 
diverge.”180  Because the regulation did not indicate how it applies to 
                                                          
 170.  Id. at 723. 
 171.  Id.  Under Auer deference, courts grant controlling weight to an agency’s interpretation 
of its own regulations.  Id. at 719 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). 
 172.  See supra Part II.C. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. at 720. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Intersex individuals are born with either indeterminate physical sex characteristics or a 
mix of characteristics associated with both male and female sexes.  Daphna Joel, Genetic-
Gonadal-Genitals Sex (3G-Sex) and the Misconception of Brain and Gender, or, Why 3G-Males 
and 3G-Females Have Intersex Brain and Intersex Gender, 3 BIOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES 27, 
27–28 (2012). 
 177.  G.G., 822 F.3d at 720–21. 
 178.  Id. at 721, 722. 
 179.  Id. at 721. 
 180.  Id. at 722 (quoting Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or 
Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2015)). 
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transgender students, the Department’s interpretation could not be 
erroneous or inconsistent.181 
The court then found that the Department’s interpretation was not a 
“convenient litigating position” or a “post hoc rationalization.”182  The court 
accepted the Department’s “novel” interpretation because school policies 
prohibiting transgender students from accessing their desired restrooms 
were also a recent phenomenon.183  The court further reasoned that the 
Department had “consistently enforced” this same position.184  Because the 
Department’s interpretation was in line with the regulations of other federal 
agencies, the court refused to deem the interpretation a post hoc 
rationalization.185  Thus, the court found that the Department’s 
interpretation deserves Auer deference and that agencies must balance any 
concerns about privacy or safety, not the courts.186 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Davis asserted that the Fourth Circuit 
should grant the preliminary injunction.187  Preliminary injunctions may be 
granted where: (1) the movant’s claims are “likely to succeed,” (2) the 
movant will “suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction,” (3) 
“the balance of hardships tips in [the movant’s] favor,” and (4) the 
“injunction is in the public interest.”188  First, Judge Davis reasoned that 
because the Department of Education’s interpretation controlled, Gavin was 
likely to succeed at trial.189  Second, Judge Davis found that Gavin’s urinary 
tract infections and “psychological distress” at being excluded from the 
boys’ restroom, which “plac[ed] G.G. at risk for accruing lifelong 
psychological harm,” were sufficient to demonstrate that Gavin would 
suffer irreparable harm without the injunction.190  Third, Judge Davis 
reasoned that “minimal or non-existent hardship” would befall other 
students “using the single-stall restrooms if they object to G.G.’s 
presence.”191  Because of the de minimus hardship to the school system and 
the significant hardship to Gavin, the balance of hardships weighed toward 
granting the injunction.192  Finally, Judge Davis found that granting the 
                                                          
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id.  
 184.  Id.  Note that the Fourth Circuit issued its decision before the Department of Education 
rescinded its guidance.  2017 DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 55, at 1. 
 185.   G.G., 822 F.3d at 722. 
 186.  Id. at 723–24. 
 187.  Id. at 727 (Davis, J., concurring). 
 188.  Id. (citing Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir. 2013)). 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. at 727, 728. 
 191.  Id. at 729. 
 192.  Id. 
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injunction would be in the public interest as the School Board was currently 
violating Gavin’s rights under Title IX.193  Altogether, Judge Davis found 
that Gavin satisfied each of the necessary prongs to receive a preliminary 
injunction.194 
Judge Niemeyer dissented from reversing the dismissal of Gavin’s 
Title IX claim and vacating the denial of Gavin’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction.195  Judge Niemeyer stated that, given the harm visited upon 
other student’s privacy interests when Gavin is allowed access to the boys’ 
restroom, he was unconvinced that the district court committed an error of 
judgment.196  The bulk of Judge Niemeyer’s opinion focused on the Title IX 
issue.197  Judge Niemeyer found that individuals have a constitutionally 
protected right to privacy in not having intimate body parts exposed to 
members of the opposite sex.198  Judge Niemeyer also stated that sex-
segregated restrooms are essential to guarding against “safety concerns that 
could arise from sexual responses prompted by students’ exposure to the 
private body parts of students of the other biological sex.”199  Though Judge 
Niemeyer acknowledged that Gavin was seeking access only to restrooms, 
Judge Niemeyer reasoned that the need to construe “sex” uniformly 
throughout Title IX and its regulations meant that this case had a direct 
bearing on whether transgender students would have access to locker and 
shower facilities.200  Thus, Judge Niemeyer argued that the Department’s 
interpretation of Title IX ran contrary to “universally accepted” norms of 
privacy and safety related to the exposure of private body parts.201 
Judge Niemeyer also reasoned that the regulation allowing for sex-
segregated restrooms was not ambiguous.202  Citing to dictionary 
definitions, Judge Niemeyer found that “sex” meant only physical criteria, 
not gender identity.203  Judge Niemeyer reasoned that the Fourth Circuit’s 
majority and Gavin sought to redefine “sex” to mean include a reference to 
gender identity.204  Judge Niemeyer argued that if “sex” meant both sex and 
gender, then the regulation would be “unworkable” because transgender 
                                                          
 193.  Id.  
 194.  Id. at 727. 
 195.  Id. at 730 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 196.  Id. at 739. 
 197.  Id. at 733–39. 
 198.  Id. at 734. 
 199.  Id. at 735. 
 200.  Id. at 736. 
 201.  Id. at 735. 
 202.  Id. at 736–37. 
 203.  Id. at 736. 
 204.  Id. at 737. 
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students “could not satisfy the conjunctive criteria.”205  In the alternative, if 
“sex” was intended to mean either sex or gender, then the School Board 
satisfied the regulation because it segregated the restrooms on the basis of 
sex.206  Finally, if “sex” were construed to mean only gender identity, Judge 
Niemeyer reasoned that schools “could never meaningfully provide separate 
restrooms” because there would be no separation of the sexes.207  Judge 
Niemeyer sought to strengthen his argument by painting a hypothetical 
picture, where schools determine whether boys are “sufficiently masculine” 
to use the boys’ restroom.208  Thus, Judge Niemeyer would have affirmed 
the district court’s decision to dismiss Gavin’s Title IX complaint.209 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In G.G., the Fourth Circuit granted controlling weight to guidance 
issued by the Department of Education, which interpreted Title IX as 
encompassing discrimination against transgender individuals.210  The 
interpretation required recipients of federal funds to provide transgender 
students with access to the restrooms consistent with their gender 
identity.211  Within the existing doctrinal framework, the Fourth Circuit 
correctly concluded that the Department of Education’s previous guidance 
was a reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation.212  Yet, the 
existing doctrinal framework does not adequately protect the rights of 
discrete and insular minorities.213  The judiciary should not extend 
deference to administrative agencies where the rights of marginalized 
groups are substantially at issue and the agencies merely have implicit 
authority to regulate.214  Instead, the Fourth Circuit should have conducted 
an independent analysis of Title IX to determine how it applies to 
transgender individuals.215  Because of the trend in federal interpretation of 
                                                          
 205.  Id.  
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id. at 738.  Judge Niemeyer appears to be using two different definitions of “sex” in order 
to illustrate this contradiction.  In this hypothetical, he argues that students are separated by their 
sex, and that sex means only gender identity.  He then suggests that the students are not separated 
by sex because students with different biology will be sharing the same restroom.  Varying 
biology, however, would not interfere with separation of students on the basis of gender identity 
alone. 
 208.  Id.  
 209.  Id. at 739. 
 210.  Id. at 723 (majority opinion). 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 213.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 214.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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Title VII, the court should have reached the same conclusion—Title IX 
requires schools to treat transgender students in accordance with their 
gender identity.216 
A.  Given the Existing Framework and the Interpretations Then in 
Place, the Fourth Circuit Correctly Applied Auer Deference 
Within the existing doctrinal framework, the Fourth Circuit correctly 
applied Auer deference because the regulation allowing for sex-segregated 
restrooms was ambiguous and interpreting sex to include gender identity 
was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.  The 
Department of Education released guidance through opinion letters and 
frequently asked questions that explained how to interpret “sex” in its own 
regulation.217  The guidance lacked the force of law because the documents 
were not rules promulgated in accordance with the Administrative 
Procedure Act, and the guidance did not change the law or add any new 
burdens on federal funding recipients.218  The guidance merely clarified 
how an existing burden applied to a set of students.  Just as the Ninth 
Circuit granted Auer deference to Department of Labor guidance in the 
form of opinion letters, Auer deference was correctly granted to the 
Department of Education’s opinion letters.219 
The Department of Education’s regulation is ambiguous as applied to 
transgender students.  The regulation states that schools “may provide 
separate toilet . . . facilities on the basis of sex.”220  Yet, neither the 
regulation nor Title IX define sex.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
“sex” as “[e]ither of the two main categories (male and female) into which 
humans and many other living things are divided on the basis of their 
reproductive functions . . . .”221  This definition suggests that physical 
bodies of people are determinative of sex.  However, the Oxford English 
Dictionary offers another definition of “sex”: “[t]he distinction between 
male and female, esp. in humans; this distinction as a social or cultural 
                                                          
 216.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 217.  See supra note 78 (collecting Department of Education guidance documents regarding 
treatment of transgender students under Title IX). 
 218.  See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(explaining that, unlike rules, general statements of policy do not “establish a ‘binding norm’” 
(quoting Reginald Parker, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in Overestimation, 60 YALE 
L.J. 581, 598 (1951))). 
 219.  See Bassiri v. Xerox Corp, 463 F.3d 927, 933 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Department of 
Labor’s opinion letters, as interpretations of that agency’s own regulations, are entitled to ‘great 
judicial deference.’” (quoting Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Whitter Props., Inc., 356 F.3d 1132, 1137 
(9th Cir. 2004))). 
 220.  34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2015). 
 221.  Sex, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com (last visited May 17, 2017). 
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phenomenon . . . .”222  This definition ignores apparent physical differences 
between male and female and focuses on social and cultural characteristics.  
Common understandings of “sex” are ambiguous as to whether male or 
female is defined by one’s body, one’s social characteristics, or a mixture of 
both.  Given that transgender people may have bodies that conflict with 
their social traits, the regulation is ambiguous as to how to assign “sex” to 
someone who is transgender. 
The Department of Education’s guidance explaining how to interpret 
sex was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.  The 
guidance explained that transgender students must be given access to 
restrooms consistent with their gender identity, thus interpreting “sex” to 
mean gender identity.  Neither the regulation nor the statute on its face 
excludes gender identity from being a part of “sex,” or even from being the 
defining feature of “sex.”  The legislative history of Title IX refers to 
“women” and “female[s]” interchangeably.223  Given the use of language 
that refers to both gender identity and physiology, the plain language points 
to a broad understanding of “sex.”  Furthermore, the legislative purpose 
supports a broad understanding of Title IX’s reach.  As Representative 
Green stated during the House of Representatives debates, “[t]he purpose of 
[Title IX] is to end discrimination in all institutions of higher education.”224  
By including gender identity as part of Title IX’s umbrage, the courts can 
give full effect to this broad congressional mandate and prevent 
discrimination on the basis of both gender identity and physical sex 
characteristics.  Thus, interpreting “sex” to mean gender identity is 
consistent with the regulation and the statute. 
Though the Department of Education rescinded its guidance,225 the 
Department could release further guidance, either agreeing with or 
contradicting its previous stance.226  If the Department of Education 
reverses its previous interpretation to indicate that Title IX does not 
encompass discrimination against transgender identities, the interpretation 
                                                          
 222.  Id. 
 223.  118 CONG. REC. 5,804 (1972). 
 224.  117 CONG. REC. 39,256 (1971); see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 
(1979) (noting there are two congressional purposes behind Title IX: preventing federal funds 
from supporting discriminatory practices and enabling citizens to protect themselves against 
discrimination).  In earlier versions of the legislation, the prohibition against sex discrimination 
was referred to as Title X.  117 CONG. REC. H4218 (daily ed. June 23, 1997) (celebrating the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of Title IX and stating “[t]his provision which was initially title X of H.R. 
7428 included the sex discrimination prohibition . . .”); 117 CONG. REC. 39,250 (1971) 
(discussing “Title 10 (the provision against discrimination against women)”). 
 225.  2017 DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 55, at 1. 
 226.  See Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that there are 
no congressionally required formalities for issuing guidance documents). 
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would not merit judicial deference.  Agency interpretations do not merit 
judicial deference when the interpretation “does not reflect the agency’s fair 
and considered judgment on the matter in question.”227  In Akzo Novel Salt, 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that an 
administrator’s policy “flip-flops” throughout the life of the case did not 
merit deference.228  The Secretary of Labor advocated one interpretation of 
a mine safety statute at the beginning of the case and a separate 
interpretation by the time the case came before the appellate court.229  The 
court held that the varying positions “strongly suggest[ed] . . . that the 
Secretary has in fact never grappled with—and thus never exercised her 
judgment over—the conundrum posed by the regulation’s clear 
ambiguity.”230  Thus, the court declined to defer to the Secretary’s 
interpretation.231 
Similarly, the Department of Education has already made one major 
change by stating that Title IX should be interpreted by the states.232  If the 
Department of Education changes course again, then the Department’s new 
interpretation would not merit deference.  Just as the Court of Appeals in 
Akzo did not grant deference to the Secretary because she changed her 
interpretation throughout the course of the litigation, a court should 
similarly decline to grant deference to the Department of Education if it 
issued new guidance.  The Department would have taken three separate 
positions throughout the course of litigation.  It is unlikely the Department 
of Education could adequately demonstrate that a change in position 
stemmed from fair consideration of the issues at hand, rather than a 
convenient litigating position.  During his campaign, President Trump 
indicated that he wished to let states decide how to treat transgender people 
and that he himself did not know what the right treatment would be.233  
While Vice President Pence agreed that states should decide, he also argued 
that states should aim to protect the “safety and privacy of children,”234 
                                                          
 227.  Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012) (quoting Auer 
v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)). 
 228.  212 F.3d 1301, 1304–05 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 229.  Id. at 1303. 
 230.  Id. at 1305. 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  2017 DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 55, at 1. 
 233.  Stacey Ritzen, Donald Trump Backpedals on His LGBT Bathroom Stance During His 
‘Jimmy Kimmel Live’ Appearance, UPROXX (May 26, 2016), http://uproxx.com/tv/donald-
trump-lgbt-bathroom-remarks-jimmy-kimmel/. 
 234.  Anugrah Kumar, Mike Pence to James Dobson: Trump Will Resolve Birth Control 
Mandate, Transgender Bathroom Issues, CHRISTIAN POST (Oct. 5, 2016, 9:31 AM), 
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terms often used by those who seek to prevent transgender students from 
using the restrooms consistent with their identity.235  Furthermore, chief 
strategist Steve Bannon publicly advocated against allowing transgender 
people to use bathrooms consistent with their gender identity by preying on 
fears about daughters using the same bathroom as men.236  These political 
statements offer a window into the reasoning of the Trump administrative 
state—new guidance from the Department of Education would likely not be 
based on scientific facts, but instead based on political aims.  The new 
guidance would “run[] counter to the evidence before the agency.”237  If the 
Department of Education were to issue guidance stating that transgender 
students do not need access to the restrooms consistent with their gender 
identity, it is likely the Department will not have truly exercised its 
judgment.  Just as in Akzo, such guidance would not merit deference. 
B.  The Decision in G.G. Is of Such Great Importance That It Should 
Not Be Left to Agency Discretion 
Although the Fourth Circuit correctly applied Auer deference within 
the current doctrinal framework, the doctrinal framework is inadequate to 
determine the legal rights of transgender students.  Rather than applying 
Auer deference, the Fourth Circuit should have extended the “major 
questions” doctrine to decide how “sex” should be interpreted under Title 
IX and its regulations.238 
In “extraordinary cases,” the Supreme Court has deemed a question of 
statutory interpretation to be of such great importance that the judiciary 
should not defer to administrative agencies in the absence of express 
congressional delegation.239  In King v. Burwell, the Supreme Court rejected 
                                                          
 235.  See, e.g., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 735 (4th Cir. 
2016) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that concerns over children’s safety and privacy were 
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 239.  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)). 
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the traditional deference analysis, holding that Congress had not delegated 
authority to the Internal Revenue Service to interpret the Affordable Care 
Act’s health insurance scheme.240  The Court reasoned that if Congress 
wished to delegate authority to the IRS, it would have done so expressly, 
given that the issue was of “deep ‘economic and political significance’ that 
is central to this statutory scheme.”241  The agency’s interpretation affected 
a billion-dollar industry and the availability of health insurance to many of 
the nation’s poorest residents.242  King relied in part on FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp.243  There, the Supreme Court found that 
Congress had not delegated to the FDA the authority to regulate the tobacco 
industry because of “its unique place in American history and society.”244 
The Supreme Court has thus carved out exemptions from implicitly 
delegated administrative regulation for extraordinarily big industries. 
The judiciary should consider the rights of discrete and insular 
minorities to be of such deep significance as to be excluded from implicit 
delegation.  If Congress wishes to delegate the authority to substantially 
affect the rights of these minorities, it must do so expressly.  The Supreme 
Court has long recognized the crucial importance of safeguarding 
marginalized groups from discrimination.245  Carving out exceptions in the 
realm of Auer deference is particularly important for politically unpopular 
groups.  As the late Justice Scalia argued, Auer deference “encourages the 
agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, 
to do what it pleases.”246  Vague rules currently insulate agencies from 
judicial review even when review is needed most—when the rights of 
discrete and insular minorities are at risk.  James Madison articulated this 
need for review during the Federal Convention when he advocated for 
judicial checks as “not only necessary for [the majority’s] own safety, but 
for the safety of a minority in Danger of oppression from an unjust and 
interested majority.”247  The oppression of marginalized identities has great 
political significance, and the “major questions” doctrine in King should 
guard against such malfeasance. 
Transgender people constitute a discrete and insular minority.  When 
determining if a group is discrete and insular, courts look to the group’s 
                                                          
 240.  Id. at 2489. 
 241.  Id. (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)).  
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Id. (citing Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120). 
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social, cultural, and political context.248  Few courts have addressed whether 
transgender people are discrete and insular.  While the Ninth Circuit 
originally stated that transgender people are not a discrete and insular 
minority,249 it later overruled this holding as public education surrounding 
transgender people has increased.250  The social, cultural, and political 
context for transgender people is one of discrimination and violence.251  
Transgender people continue to face “disturbing patterns of mistreatment 
and discrimination . . . when it comes to the most basic elements of life, 
such as finding a job, having a place to live, accessing medical care, and 
enjoying the support of family and community.”252  Given such rampant 
discrimination, transgender people cannot adequately use the popular 
democratic machinery to protect their rights.253   Thus, transgender people 
constitute a discrete and insular minority.254 
G.G. in particular represents a strong case for extending the “major 
questions” exception to administrative deference.  Discrimination manifests 
in one of its most noxious forms when educational opportunities depend on 
sharing the same identity as those in political power.  In Brown v. Board of 
                                                          
 248.  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 473 n.24 (1985) (Marshall, 
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 249.  Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (1977) (quoting Graham v. 
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 254.  See also Krista D. Brown, Comment, The Transgender Student-Athlete: Is There a 
Fourteenth Amendment Right to Participate on the Gender-Specific Team of Your Choice?, 25 
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 311, 318–19 (2014) (arguing that transgender people are discrete and 
insular minorities for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment); Heather L. McKay, Note, 
Fighting for Victoria: Federal Equal Protection Claims Available to American Transgender 
Schoolchildren, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 493, 514–17 (2011) (arguing that transgender children are 
discrete and insular minorities by focusing on the intersection of their age and transgender 
identity); Cathy Perifimos, Note, The Changing Faces of Women’s Colleges: Striking a Balance 
Between Transgender Rights and Women’s Colleges’ Right to Exclude, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & 
GENDER 141, 159 (2008) (arguing transgender people are discrete and insular minorities and 
noting “that the transgender community is disadvantaged in the political world—transgender 
people should be given more attention and greater protection”). 
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Education,255 the Supreme Court recognized the long-standing social and 
political implications of education, stating, “It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities . . . .  It is the very 
foundation of good citizenship.”256  Yet, the Gloucester County School 
Board sought a policy that would undermine the scholastic success of its 
transgender student.257  When schools deny students the right to self-
identify by publicly rejecting those students’ core identities, schools tacitly 
endorse an atmosphere of hostility and harassment towards transgender 
students.258  By prohibiting students from using the bathrooms consistent 
with their gender identity, “the students are dehumanized by authorities.”259  
Transgender students often already face problems in school, particularly 
with isolation and harassment.260  Repeated studies demonstrate that 
bullying and harassment lead to poor school achievement, lower grades, 
and more skipped classes.261  School policies that recognize and accept 
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PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Sept. 2016, at 20, 23. 
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transgender students’ actual gender identities are crucial to negating the 
deleterious effects of prejudice on self-esteem and school performance.262 
When schools insist on maintaining educational policies that result in 
students underperforming academically simply for existing as their 
authentic selves,263 the judiciary should not treat these policies as equivalent 
to mere political preferences.264  These educational policies will lay the 
foundation for transgender youth to either participate effectively in the 
political process or maintain a position of political marginalization.265  The 
educational rights of transgender students should not hinge on the whims of 
voters in presidential swing states or even the whims of a political majority.  
By deferring to administrative agencies, the courts enable politically-
minded officials to eviscerate the protections for marginalized groups as 
soon as their protection becomes inconvenient.  Rather than permitting 
these communities to endure a fleeting and precarious sense of safety, if 
they feel safe at all, the judiciary should check the administrative state by 
requiring an express congressional delegation of authority prior to allowing 
an administrative agency to determine the political rights of the 
marginalized.  Since Congress did not expressly delegate to the Department 
of Education the ability to determine how transgender students might be 
protected under Title IX, the courts should conduct an independent analysis 
of Title IX and its regulations. 
C.  Title IX Sex Discrimination Encompasses Gender Identity 
Title VII case law indicates that courts should interpret Title IX sex 
discrimination as including discrimination on the basis of gender identity.  
When interpreting Title IX, courts look to Title VII.266  Though courts have 
split on whether “sex” under Title VII encompasses gender identity, courts 
have endorsed two theories that would cover gender identity.  Based on the 
Supreme Court’s sex stereotyping theory, which the Court first applied in a 
case where employers saw a woman as too “macho,” courts have found sex 
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discrimination where employers see transgender individuals as too gender-
diverse.267  Similarly, one could find impermissible sex stereotyping where 
a transgender boy, such as Gavin, failed to conform to sex stereotypes 
either by failing to present himself as feminine or by failing to have the 
typical male body characteristics. 
The second theory under Title VII describes discrimination on the 
basis of transgender identity as per se sex discrimination.268  The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission has declared that “discrimination 
against a transgender individual because that person is transgender is, by 
definition, discrimination ‘based on . . . sex,’ and such discrimination 
therefore violates Title VII.”269  The District of Maryland agreed, stating 
that a claim of discrimination based on one’s “‘obvious transgendered 
status’ is a cognizable claim of sex discrimination.”270  This means that 
preventing Gavin from using the boys’ restroom because he is transgender 
would amount to sex discrimination simply because he is being treated 
differently on the basis of his transgender identity, rather than his failure to 
conform with sex stereotypes. 
Case law is trending toward accepting these two theories of sex 
discrimination.271  Though earlier cases rejected claims seeking to include 
gender identity under sex, a legal sea change is expanding protections for 
transgender students.  The Seventh Circuit’s formative case, Ulane v. 
Eastern Airlines, Inc., has been overruled, at least as it pertains to sexual 
orientation.272  The circuit indicated a willingness to reopen the question of 
gender identity.273  Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit expressly stated that 
“[s]cientific research may someday cause a shift in the plain meaning of the 
term ‘sex’ so that it extends beyond the two starkly defined categories of 
male and female.”274  Science has indeed progressed.  For example, the 
World Professional Association for Transgender Health recently updated its 
internationally accepted standards of care to reflect the individuality of 
gender identity, acknowledging that gender exists in a variety of 
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complicated ways beyond the male-female binary.275  Increasingly, 
scholarship embraces an understanding of “sex” that reflects the nuanced 
reality of transgender identities.276  As society’s understanding of sex and 
gender have developed, the definition of “sex” has changed.  Courts have a 
well-founded basis to conclude that sex discrimination under Title IX 
includes discrimination on the basis of gender identity. 
Even if courts did not find the definition of “sex” includes gender 
identity, courts have a strong legal basis for determining that sex 
discrimination encompasses discrimination on the basis of transgender 
identities.  For example, one district court has explained that just as 
religious discrimination includes discrimination against one for converting 
religions, sex discrimination includes discrimination against one for 
changing physical sex.277  Thus, judicial principles in other areas of anti-
discrimination law neatly demonstrate that conversions are protected.  
Under these theories, discrimination against Gavin for undergoing a female-
to-male transition violates Title IX just as if discrimination against a student 
for either a male or a female identity would violate Title IX.  Thus, even if 
the G.G. court did not give Auer deference to the Department of 
Education’s guidance, the court should have reached the same conclusion 
by reading Title IX to prevent discrimination against the plaintiff on the 
basis of his transgender identity. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Circuit rightly decided that Gloucester County School 
Board must allow Gavin to use the boys’ restroom under Title IX and its 
regulations.278  Given the existing doctrinal framework, the court properly 
gave Auer deference to the Department of Education’s interpretation of its 
own regulation.279  Yet, the doctrinal framework is inadequate to protect the 
rights of discrete and insular minorities, including Gavin.280  The judiciary 
should extend the major questions doctrine applied in King v. Burwell to 
include questions touching on the rights of marginalized groups.281  
Applying the major questions doctrine, the Fourth Circuit should have 
foregone administrative deference to conduct an independent analysis of 
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Title IX.  The court should have reached the same conclusion based on  
Title VII case law—transgender students’ use of the bathrooms consistent 
with their gender identity is protected under Title IX.282 
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